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Cornelis Hoogerwerf 
Proving the Resurrection of the Flesh 
The Use of Natural Philosophy and Galenic Epistemology in Pseudo-
Justin’s De Resurrectione 
The treatise De resurrectione, which has survived under the name of Justin 
Martyr in some extensive fragments, is an exponent of a larger debate about 
the resurrection in the second and the early third centuries.1 The fact that 
resurrection is one of the first theological subjects to which entire writings 
are devoted, says a lot about the centrality of this topic within the develop-
ment of Christianity.2 For Greek intellectuals like Celsus it was a clear 
example of the barbaric and flesh-bound character of the Christian religion, 
while within the various currents of Christianity resurrection received vastly 
different interpretations. Its distinctiveness and its capacity to harbour fun-
damental questions of existence led to the situation that the right under-
————— 
1  This article is a revision and elaboration of parts of my master thesis: The Debate about 
the Resurrection around 180 CE and the ‘Hellenization’ of Christianity (Leiden University, 2014). 
2  The development of the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh was studied by H.E. Lo-
na, Über die Auferstehung des Fleisches: Studien zur frühchristlichen Eschatologie, Beihefte zur 
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 66 (Berlin, 1993). See also Katharina Schnei-
der, Studien zur Entfaltung der altkirchlichen Theologie der Auferstehung, Hereditas 14 (Bonn, 
1999). 
Cornelis Hoogerwerf, ‘Proving the Resurrection of the Flesh: The Use of 
Natural Philosophy and Galenic Epistemology in Pseudo-Justin’s De Res-
urrectione’, in Joseph Verheyden, Andreas Merkt, and Tobias Nicklas 
(eds.), “If Christ has not been raised…”: Studies on the Reception of the 
Resurrection Stories and the Belief in the Resurrection in the Early Church 
(Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus/Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen 
Testaments 115; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,  2016), 135–147. 
 
Pre-print version. 
standing of the doctrine became an identity marker of the true Christian.3 In 
sociological terms, not having the right opinion about this matter was a 
clear sign of deviance from the group.4 At the same time, the deviance of 
the idea of the resurrection of the flesh from the dominant intellectual cul-
ture could be turned into an advantage. In the conclusion of De resurrec-
tione the resurrection of the flesh is advertised as a unique selling point of 
Christianity, ‘a new and strange hope’ that distinguishes Christ from Plato 
and Pythagoras. In this way the author of the treatise attempts to persuade 
his intended audience: the ‘weak’ who stay at the border of his group, those 
who are at risk leaving or who are dissuaded from joining. The strategy to 
protect the identity of the social group (namely urging those who are less 
prototypical group members to conform to the norms) is complemented by 
the strategy of clearly marking those who seem members, but have the 
wrong opinion, as outsiders,   
[p. 136]  
belonging to the camp of the enemy. The author takes up arms against ‘the 
adversary’, ‘the ruler of wickedness’ and his apostles.5 
In recent research, scholars have suggested various candidates for the au-
thorship of De resurrectione: Hippolytus of Rome (early third century),6 
Athenagoras (around 180 CE),7 and ‘Deutero-Justin’ (late second century, 
before 211/212 CE).8 As these hypotheses have been formulated inde-
pendently of each other, it is safe to assume that De resurrectione was writ-
ten somewhere in the period from the latter decades of the second century 
to the early third century CE. Most of the objections against the resurrection 
of the flesh that are mentioned, are also known from other sources in this 
————— 
3  W.C. van Unnik, ‘The Newly Discovered Gnostic “Epistle to Rheginos” on the Resurrec-
tion: II’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History 15 (1964), 153–167, at 154 and 164. Claudia Setzer, 
Resurrection of the Body in Early Judaism and Early Christianity: Doctrine, Community and Self-
Definition (Boston, 2004), 76–77, 84–86. 
4  For the sociological concept of deviance and the strategies used in this context see Outi 
Lehtipuu, Debates over the Resurrection of the Dead: Constructing Early Christian Identity 
(Oxford, 2015), 67–108. 
5  Pseudo-Justin, De resurrectione 1.12; 10.7–12. The edition of the text used in this article 
is Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung: Text und Studie, ed. Martin Heimgartner, Patristische 
Texte und Studien 54 (Berlin, 2001), 102–131. 
6  Alice Whealey, ‘Hippolytus’ Lost De Universo and De Resurrectione: Some New Hy-
potheses’, Vigiliae Christianae 50 (1996), 244–256; eadem, ‘Pseudo-Justin’s De Resurrectione: 
Athenagoras or Hippolytus?’, Vigiliae Christianae 60 (2006), 420–430. 
7  Heimgartner, Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung, 203–221. A weak spot in his argu-
ments is that he limits his stylistic comparison to Justin, Pseudo-Justin, Athenagoras and Pseudo-
Athenagoras. 
8  Pseudo-Giustino, Sulla resurrezione: Discorso cristiano del II secolo, ed. Alberto 
D’Anna (Brescia, 2001), 112–128, 286–287. 
period, most notably from Celsus’ sneering comments on ‘the hope of 
worms’.9 
The aim of the present article is not to settle this issue, but to explore 
how the use of Hellenistic philosophy (specifically natural philosophy and 
epistemology) in De resurrectione fits the author’s task of defending and 
reinforcing the disputed doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh, and how 
this use is related to the actual philosophy of the time. 
1. The Resurrection of the Flesh and Natural Philosophy 
The overarching thesis of De resurrectione is that the flesh is saved in the 
resurrection. This is argued in three sub-theses, preceded by the refutation 
of sophistries of the opponents. According to them, the flesh will rise either 
complete or incomplete, both with undesirable consequences: the presence 
of genitals or the incapability of God. The author brings the first problem 
back to one point, namely that the existence of body parts necessarily 
means that they are working, which is refuted with the examples of barren-
ness and virginity. The second problem is addressed by the assertion that 
the healings of Jesus show that bodies will not rise incomplete.10 
Then the author proceeds with a positive, orderly proof of the resurrec-
tion of the flesh. The first sub-thesis is that the reconstitution of the flesh is 
[p. 137]  
possible. This nicely fits the main objection against the resurrection of the 
flesh, formulated by Celsus as follows: ‘[...] It is impossible [...]. For what 
sort of body, completely and utterly destroyed, could return to its original 
nature and to that same first constitution from which it was dissolved?’11 It 
is exactly this problem, in similar wording, that is taken up by the author of 
De resurrectione, when he reproduces the following statement: ‘For it is 
impossible that this flesh, being destroyed and dissolved in small particles, 
is gathered together into the same unit.’12  
The second sub-thesis is that the flesh, as the handiwork of God, is wor-
thy of salvation. Again Celsus’ objections come to mind: for him, God is 
not able to raise the despicable flesh, because that would be a shameful act, 
————— 
9  Celsus as cited by Origen, Contra Celsum 5.14. 
10  Ps.Just. Res. 2.5-13; 3.1-4.6. 
11  Or. Cels. 5.14: [...] ἀδύνατον [...]· ποῖον γὰρ σῶμα πάντῃ διαφθαρὲν οἷόν τε ἐπανελθεῖν 
εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσιν καὶ αὐτὴν ἐκείνην, ἐξ ἧς ἐλύθη, τὴν πρώτην σύστασιν; Origène, Contre 
Celse, ed. Marcel Borret, Sources chrétiennes 132, 136, 147, 150, 227 (Paris, 1967–1976). 
12  Ps.Just. Res. 2.2: ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὴν φθειρομένην καὶ διὰ λεπτῶν λυομένην ταύτην 
συναχθῆναι εἰς τὸ αὐτό. 
against reason and thus against God self. The opponents in De resurrec-
tione argue similarly that the flesh is sinful and not worthy of resurrection.13  
Finally, in the third sub-thesis the author argues against those who doubt 
that the flesh has the promise of resurrection. The first reaction of the au-
thor is to ask if we want to accuse God of creating the world in vain if only 
a part of the human being will be saved. But ‘the Reason of the universe is 
not foolish’, and therefore the flesh is included in salvation.14 
The elaboration of the first statement – that the reconstitution of the flesh 
is possible – is a fundamental part of De resurrectione and stands out in its 
explicit discussion of strategy and the use of exclusively ‘worldly argu-
ments’ (λόγοι κοσμικοί). In the fifth chapter, the author begins to drive his 
Christian opponents into a corner by arguing that they do not believe in the 
power of their own god, in which respect they even believe less than unbe-
lievers about their gods. Then he proceeds as follows: 
(5) 11 But now we try to demonstrate that the resurrection of the flesh is possible, 
asking from the children of the truth to judge kindly when we even engage in argu-
ments of this world, which appear to belong to those outside; 12 firstly because there 
is nothing outside of God, not even the world itself – for it is his work –, secondly 
because we engage in these arguments with unbelievers in view. 13 Let me explain 
that. If we had believing unbelievers in view, it would suffice to answer: ‘We be-
lieve.’ But now it is necessary to proceed by means of demonstrations. 14 It is true, 
the mentioned proofs would be enough to demonstrate the possibility of the resurrec-
tion of the flesh, 15 but because they are very unbelieving, we will bring forward the 
argument not from the faith – for they do not belong to that –, but, in order that it is 
all the more compelling, from the unbelief, their mother, I mean of course the worldly 
[p. 138]  
arguments. 16 For if we demonstrate from these that the resurrection of the flesh is 
possible, they are doubtlessly worthy of much shame if they are able to follow neither 
the arguments of the faith nor of the world.15 
The author distinguishes between three arenas of discussion. Firstly ‘the 
children of the truth’, who have their faith as proof, as the author has argued 
in the prologue (to which I will return in the next section). Next, ‘believing 
unbelievers’: those who believe that gods can do everything, and for whom 
it is sufficient to say that you believe God can raise the flesh. The proofs 
(τεκμήρια) of creation and procreation mentioned earlier in the fifth chapter 
belong here. But the third group, those who are ‘very unbelieving’, require 
a demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) comprising only worldly arguments. The au-
thor justifies his involvement with the arguments of ‘those outside’ towards 
‘the children of the truth’, firstly, with the reminder that there is nothing 
————— 
13  Ps.Just. Res. 7. 
14  Ps.Just. Res. 8–9. 
15  Ps.Just. Res. 5.11–16. The elaboration of the first sub-thesis covers 5.2–6.18. 
outside of God, implicating that worldly arguments cannot contradict the 
truth. In the second place, he seeks common ground in worldly arguments 
in order to be more compelling, not so much with the goal to persuade the 
opponents, but rather to put them to shame in the minds of those who doubt, 
by showing that the opponents are beyond reason. 
The need of an explicit justification of the use of exclusively worldly ar-
guments is consistent with the fact that this strategy goes beyond the care-
fully constructed epistemological position formulated in the prologue. This 
bold move strengthens the position of the author by not closing off to the 
world, but claiming the rationality of the world, God’s world after all, as a 
powerful ally. Among the defenders of the resurrection of the flesh in this 
period the author of De resurrectione distinguishes itself by casting a fun-
damental part of his treatise in the form of a demonstration that intentional-
ly invokes only the very philosophy that usually despised the defended 
doctrine. Some scholars have called this move revolutionary.16 It must be 
noted, however, that the idea of the argument that the reconstruction of the 
dissolved body is possible according to the philosophies of Plato and Py-
thagoras, is already found in the Legatio of Athenagoras.17 The strategy of 
our author is, in any case, an indication of the search for common ground 
with contemporary knowledge and shows an openness to rationality that is 
characteristic for the emergence of Christian theology.18 
The demonstration itself consists of a summary of the natural philosophy 
of three main schools of philosophy: Platonism, Stoicism and Epicurean-
ism. The common doctrine which they all endorse is that the elements (τὰ 
στοιχεῖα), from which everything originates, are imperishable. Then, God is 
compared to respectively a sculptor, a metallurgist and a mosaic-making 
artist, who, after   
[p. 139]  
an entity has been dissolved into its elements, can restore it to the same 
form as it was before. The author claims that in this way it is sufficiently 
proven that the resurrection of the flesh is possible ‘according to the gen-
tiles’.19 He does not discuss the philosophical doctrines in depth, but only in 
so far as it suits his purpose.20 The source of the information about the phil-
osophical schools was probably doxographical literature in one form or 
another, as the parallel descriptions of the respective philosophies in the 
famous work of Diogenes Laertius and in Hippolytus’ Refutatio omnium 
————— 
16  See Heimgartner, Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung, 168. 
17  Athenagoras, Legatio 36.3. 
18  See Eric Osborn, The Emergence of Christian Theology (Cambridge, 1993), 287. 
19  Ps.Just. Res. 6.1–18. 
20  Compare the explicit mention of this method in Athenag. Leg. 6.3. 
haeresium attest.21 That our author perceived the philosophical world 
through the lens of this kind of literature, is clear from the example of the 
description of Plato’s natural philosophy as having two universal principles, 
god’s providence and matter. This is also the case in Diogenes Laertius’ 
description, whereas Plato in his Timaeus (30b–c) only mentions the crea-
tive act of god’s providence, not matter. 
Recapitulatory statements in the works of the physician Galen also pro-
vide interesting parallels to Pseudo-Justin’s understanding of the nature of 
the body. ‘All bodies that admit of generation and destruction’ consist of 
elements, the least parts of something.22 ‘All physicians and philosophers’ 
think that the body consists of ‘the elements, whatever they may be.’ Galen 
mentions Asclepiades (solid masses and the passages between them), Epi-
curus (atoms), Anaxagoras (homoeomeries), and Chrysippus and all the 
Stoics, together with Aristotle, Theophrastus, Plato, and Hippocrates (hot, 
cold, dry, and wet).23 Elsewhere Galen recalls, besides other schools of 
thought, the doctrine of Empedocles on the elements and compares his view 
on the mixture of the four primary elements in the body with making a 
refined mix of four metals.24 Pseudo-Justin uses the term ‘element’ in the 
same way as Galen for whatever was thought to be the smallest part from 
which everything is constituted, including the body. And he uses the same 
imagery of the mixing of four metals. In a more general sense, Pseudo-
Justin’s approach to natural philosophy corresponds to Galen’s insistence 
on knowledge of the elements of   
[p. 140]  
the body, and to the importance Galen attributed to universal agreement.25 
There is, however, an important difference, which attests to the somewhat 
superficial character of Pseudo-Justin’s treatment. Galen, following the 
Stoic position of Chrysippus, explicitly denied that the elements are imper-
————— 
21  For Plato, see Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum 3.69 and Hippolytus, Refutatio 
omnium haeresium 1.19.1. For Epicurus, see D.L. 10.38, 43, 46 and Hippol. Haer. 1.22.1–2. For 
the sources of Hippolytus, see Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as 
a Source for Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua 56 (Leiden, 1992). 
22  Galenus, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 8.2.1–3. Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippoc-
rates and Plato, ed. Phillip de Lacy, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum V 4.1.2, 3 vols. (Berlin, 
1984). See also Galenus, De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia 1.1; 8.5. Galen, On the Elements 
according to Hippocrates, ed. Phillip de Lacy, CMG V 1.2 (Berlin, 1996). 
23  Gal. P.H.P. 5.3.17–18. 
24  Galenus, In Hippocratis de natura hominis 1.3. Galeni In Hippocratis de natura hominis 
[…], ed. Johannes Mewaldt […], CMG V 9.1 (Leipzig, 1914). Heimgartner, Pseudojustin, Über 
die Auferstehung, 163 points out this parallel. 
25  Jonathan Barnes, ‘Galen on Logic and Therapy’, in: Fridolf Kudlien and Richard J. Durl-
ing (eds.), Galen’s Method of Healing: Proceedings of the 1982 Symposium, Studies in Ancient 
Medicine 1 (Leiden, 1991), 50-102, at 78-79 and 93. 
ishable (ἄφθαρτα), as Pseudo-Justin would have it.26 Galen distinguished 
between elements, ‘bodies’ that have the extreme form of one of the four 
principle qualities, and the underlying eternal matter, being ungenerated and 
imperishable. The four elements originate when matter is ‘informed’ by the 
four principal qualities.27 
Crucial for Pseudo-Justin’s argument is the assertion that there is agree-
ment about the doctrine that ‘there is neither coming into being from not 
being, nor dissolving and perishing into not being.’28 In another summariz-
ing statement, Galen reports that in his (now lost) work De demonstratione 
he discussed that the philosophers of old discerned a class of things that are 
indemonstrable truths, among which the proposition ‘that everything comes 
from some existing thing, while nothing comes from something that does 
not exist at all. So too, [they say that] nothing is destroyed to what is com-
pletely nonexistent.’29 Heimgartner’s assertion that Pseudo-Justin is clearly 
dependent on Epicurus’ wording of this doctrine,30 may be true, but Galen’s 
remarks prove that the doctrine itself was understood to be a κοινὸν δόγμα. 
All in all, the author of De resurrectione formulates an answer to the rhe-
torical questions that asserted the impossibility of the resurrection of the 
flesh. He succeeds, at the very least, in generating the impression that the 
doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh is compatible with the main schools 
of natural philosophy. Of course, even if the physical possibility of the 
resurrection of the flesh would be accepted, the question whether it is a 
reasonable thing for God to do would still be open. Philosophers certainly 
would have objected to a god who irrationally restores the prison of the 
soul, or who concerns himself with humankind at all. But the author of De 
resurrectione works with the concept of the Creator-God inherited from 
Christian tradition and Judaism, which he elaborates in his subsequent 
treatment of the value of the flesh. For the intended audience, the proof of 
the  
[p. 141]  
possibility of the resurrection of the flesh according to Hellenistic philoso-
phy has the function of convincing them that this doctrine is not as irration-
————— 
26  Ps.Just. Res. 6.4, 11. 
27  D.L. 7.134 (Chrysippus); Gal. Hipp. elem. 6.38-40. Franjo Kovačić, Der Begriff der Phy-
sis bei Galen vor dem Hintergrund seiner Vorgänger, Philosophie der Antike 12 (Stuttgart, 2001), 
97–98. See also Heimgartner, Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung, 162. 
28  Ps.Just. Res. 6.4: τὸ μήτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι μήτε εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλύεσθαι καὶ 
ἀπόλλυσθαι. 
29  Galenus, De methodo medendi 1.4: καὶ πάντ’ ἐξ ὄντος τινὸς, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδόλως ὄντος 
οὐδέν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ φθείρεσθαι μηδὲν εἰς τὸ τέως οὐκ ὂν. Translation from: Galen, Method of 
Medicine, vol. 1: Books 1-4, ed. Ian Johnston and G.H.R. Horsley, Loeb Classical Library 516 
(Cambridge, 2011). 
30  See D.L. 10.38 (Epicurus), and Heimgartner, Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung, 160. 
al and intellectually absurd as the opponents say it is. In fact, the author 
pictures the opponents as irrational for not even being able to follow the 
doctrines of the world. 
2. Christian and Hellenistic Epistemology 
In the prologue or proem of De resurrectione the subject of the treatise – 
the resurrection of the flesh – is not mentioned. Instead, it begins with the 
following declaration: 
(1) 1 The Word of the Truth is free and sovereign, not willing to be accessible to any 
test of refutation, or to abide patiently the examination by way of demonstration with 
its hearers. 2 For its nobleness and trustworthiness want that the one who sent it is 
believed himself. 3 A Word of Truth is sent by God. 4 Therefore also the freedom 
with which it is surrounded is not vulgar. For it (the Word of Truth), being brought 
forward with authority, does reasonably not want that demonstrations are asked for 
what is said, because there are no other proofs apart from the Truth itself – and God is 
precisely that. 
In short, the message (λόγος) of the truth is beyond negative or positive 
proof, because it carries the proof in itself. The idea that God’s truth trans-
cends demonstration and commands faith because of its trustworthiness, is 
already found in the works of Justin and Athenagoras.31 Moreover, the motif 
of introducing an apology by stating that it is in fact unnecessary is a com-
mon rhetorical ploy. But that Pseudo-Justin has a particular axe to grind 
becomes clear by his use of the word φορτικός (vulgar, low). It reflects the 
criticisms of philosophers like Galen and Celsus, who thought of Christians 
as simple-minded people with blind faith in undemonstrated doctrines, 
using expressions such as ‘Do not examine, but believe.’32 Resorting to 
belief as a strategy of defence certainly occurred in early Christian circles.33 
In the Epistula ad Rheginum resurrection is viewed as a matter of belief, not 
of persuading: philosophers cannot contribute anything useful to the discus-
sion.34 In contrast to such an opposing stance towards rational inquiry,  
[p. 142]  
————— 
31  Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 7.2; Athenag. Leg. 7.2; 9.1; 11.1; 12.3. See D’Anna, 
Pseudo-Giustino, Sulla resurrezione, 184–185 on the affinity between Just. Dial. and Ps.Just. Res. 
on this point. 
32  Celsus as cited in Or. Cels. 1.9; compare 1.13, 18; 3.44, 50; and Gal. De puls. diff. 2.4; 
3.3; see also Luc. Peregr. 13 and D’Anna, Pseudo-Giustino, Sulla resurrezione, 182–183. 
33  See for instance Apelles in Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 5.13.5. 
34  Epistula ad Rheginum 46.3-20. M.L. Peel (ed.), ‘NHC 1,4: The Treatise on the Resurrec-
tion’, in: Harold W. Attridge (ed.), Nag Hammadi Codex I (The Jung Codex): Introductions, Texts, 
Translations, Indices, Nag Hammadi Studies 22 (Leiden, 1985), 123–157. 
Pseudo-Justin argues that freedom over against proof is not characteristic of 
credulous simpletons, but follows reasonably from the authoritative nature 
of the truth itself. He proceeds with an epistemological justification: 
(1) 5 Every proof namely is stronger and more believable than what is proven. In-
deed, what is not believed at first, before the proof has arrived, finds belief when that 
is provided and it appears to be as is said. 6 But nothing is stronger and more believa-
ble than the truth. Therefore, someone who asks proof for this is like someone who 
wants that what appears to the senses is demonstrated by reason that it appears. 7 For 
sense perception is criterion of what is apprehended through reason, but there is no 
criterion for sense perception except itself. 8 Well, just as we what is seized through 
reason bring before the senses and judge of what nature what is said actually is, true 
or false, and judge no longer because we believe the senses, in the same way we send 
the arguments about men and the world up to the Truth and judge with it whether they 
are wrong or not, but we judge the words of the Truth with nothing else, because we 
believe it. 
The author states, firstly, that a demonstration always rests on what is 
stronger and more believable, and what is stronger and more believable 
than the truth? He draws, in the second place, a parallel with sense percep-
tion as the ultimate criterion whether statements are true or false. 
After having established that belief in the truth is not irrational, Pseudo-
Justin finally fills the reader in with the Christian specifics of this general 
theory. The λόγος of the Truth is identified with the Son of God, Jesus 
Christ, who is himself guarantee (πίστις) and proof. Therefore, those who 
acknowledge that, have their faith (πίστις) as proof. And because the Son 
came in the flesh and gave in himself the resurrection from the dead, it is 
implied that there must not be any doubt about the resurrection of the 
flesh.35 
Scholars who have studied De resurrectione have paid little or no atten-
tion to the fact that the theory of πίστις found in the works of Clement of 
Alexandria is closely related to the ideas expressed in the prologue of our 
treatise.36 Clement’s concern is to salvage πίστις as an intellectually reputa-
ble term over against Valentinians, who considered πίστις inferior to 
γνῶσις, and over against the contempt of the (Middle) Platonists for πίστις 
as blind faith in undemonstrated doctrines. How does Clement rehabilitate 
πίστις? First of all, the science of demonstration depends on what is prior 
and better known. But unless we admit an infinite regress, there must be 
————— 
35  Ps.Just. Res. 1.9-11. 
36  Parallels with Clement are noted by Heimgartner, Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung, 
83–86. See also Matyáš Havrda, ‘Demonstrative Method in Stromateis VII: Context, Principles 
and Purpose’, in: Matyáš Havrda, Vít Hušek, and Jana Plátová (eds.), The Seventh Book of the 
Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Olomouc, October 21-23, 
2010),Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 117 (Leiden, 2012), 261–275, at 262–263. 
first principles at the basis of our knowledge that are not demonstrable. 
Nothing precedes the Unbegotten, so that the ultimate indemonstrable first 
principle is God, only knowable   
[p. 143]  
through belief in his λόγος. This first principle carries its proof in itself.37 In 
Clement’s own words: 
What has to be judged is not to be trusted before it is judged, so that what is in need 
of judgment cannot be a first principle. Accordingly, while we reasonably grasp the 
indemonstrable first principle by faith, and receive from the first principle itself 
demonstrations concerning the first principle in abundance, we are educated by the 
voice of the Lord towards the knowledge of the truth.38 
For Clement, πίστις has become the cornerstone of his epistemology. The 
λόγος, apprehended by faith, is used as a criterion in the search for facts. 
Therefore, πίστις without proof is not only appropriate for the uneducated, 
it is the precondition of any stable knowledge: ‘Faith is superior to 
knowledge, and its criterion.’39 
Just as Pseudo-Justin, Clement makes ‘an analogy between faith in the 
indemonstrable first principle and sensation as a basis for knowledge.’40 He 
refers to Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus, who said that sense perception 
is the beginning (ἀρχή) of faith. Accordingly, faith in the Scriptures pro-
vides a sure judgment and undeniable proof.41 
It appears that Clement and the author of De resurrectione conceptualize 
the relation of faith, truth and knowledge in a very similar manner, although 
Clement’s treatment is more extensive and profound.42 The epistemological 
justification in De resurrectione agrees with Clement’s theory of πίστις in 
at least three aspects. Firstly, the analogy made between sense perception as 
faculty of judgment, and truth as faculty of judgment. In the second place, 
both authors share the idea that there must be a first principle that com-
mands faith, because proof is always stronger than what is proven. Finally, 
the ultimate first principle is the truth, which is to be identified as God. 
————— 
37  Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2.(4.)13.4–14.3; 2.(5.)24.2–3; 5.(12.)82.3–4; 
7.(16.)95.4–6. 
38  Clem. Alex., Str. 7.(16.)95.5–6. Clemens Alexandrinus, vol. 2: Stromata Buch I-VI, and 
vol. 3: Stromata Buch VII und VIII [...], ed. L. Früchtel, Otto Stählin, and Ursula Treu, Die grie-
chischen christlichen Schriftsteller 52 (15), 17 (Berlin, 3rd edn. 1960, and 2nd edn. 1970). 
39  Clem. Alex. Str. 2.(4.)15.5; compare 1.(1.)8.2; 2.(4.)12.1; and see particularly 2.(2.)8.1–
9.7. 
40  Elizabeth A. Clark, Clement’s Use of Aristotle: The Aristotelian Contribution to Clement 
of Alexandria’s Refutation of Gnosticism (New York, 1977), 20. 
41  Clem. Alex. Str. 2.(2.)9.5–6. 
42  Havrda, ‘Demonstrative Method’, 262. 
On the basis of De resurrectione alone, scholars have noted that its epis-
temological position has similarities with the Stoic and Epicurean notion of 
‘preconception’ (πρόληψις) as a criterion of truth and starting point of 
demonstration.43 But in light of Clement’s analogous treatment of this mat-
ter it is possible to shed more light on the philosophical context. Clement 
indeed discusses the term ‘preconception’, and also the Stoic term ‘assent’ 
(συγκα- 
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τάθεσις), to provide philosophical parallels to the Christian meaning of 
πίστις. However, these terms are reinterpreted by him to fit them into the 
framework of his main source of ideas about πίστις and proof: Aristotle and 
his school.44 In the case of the first two points of agreement between De 
resurrectione and Clement (mentioned above), the latter explicitly calls 
upon the authority of Aristotle and Theophrastus.45 Aristotle, in order to 
solve the problem of infinite regress, had to assume that there are undemon-
strated principles at the end of the dialectic process, first principles that are 
self-evident and command faith. As is extensively discussed in the scholarly 
literature, Clement’s defence of πίστις as an intellectually responsible act is 
largely dependent on Aristotle and the Peripatetic school.46 There are, of 
course, important differences. The first has to do with the third point of 
agreement between De resurrectione and Clement: God as the ultimate first 
principle. Clement links πίστις to an ontological first principle, God, where-
as the Aristotelian πίστις relates to logical first principles. Also, in the 
school of Aristotle πίστις does not have a particular technical meaning, but 
Clement transformed this term into a central concept of his epistemology.47 
The fact that Clement’s epistemology has been influenced by Aristotle, 
does not necessarily implicate that Clement had direct access to the writings 
of the philosopher. His knowledge of Aristotelian logic was, as it seems, 
primarily mediated by the tradition of the schools, which at the time were 
involved in extensive epistemological discussions about the criteria of the 
————— 
43  D.L. 7.52, 54; Aetius, Placita 4.11 (Stoicism); D.L. 10.33, 38 (Epicurus). See Heimgart-
ner, Pseudojustin, Über die Auferstehung, 135. 
44  Clem. Alex. Str. 2.(2.)8.1–9.7; 2.(4.)16.3; 2.(12.)55.1. Clark, Clement’s Use of Aristotle, 
20–21; Raoul Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie 
(Leiden, 1973), 115, 119; Salvatore R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian 
Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford, 1971), 127–131. 
45  For example, Clem. Alex. Str. 2.(2.)9.5–6; 2.(4.)15.5. 
46  Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 120–123; Mortley, Connaissance religieuse, 109–125; 
Georgia Apostolopoulou, Die Dialektik bei Klemens von Alexandria: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
der philosophischen Methoden, Europäische Hochschulschriften 20.29 (Frankfurt a.M., 1977), 87–
98; Clark, Clement’s Use of Aristotle, 17–18. 
47  Clark, Clement’s Use of Aristotle, 21–23. 
truth.48 Lilla points especially to parallels between Clement and the Middle 
Platonist philosophers Antiochus of Askalon and Albinus (i.e. Alcinous).49 
There may be, however, another candidate that shows much affinity with 
the epistemology of De resurrectione and Clement: the great second centu-
ry physician-philosopher Galen. It is certain that in the beginning of the 
third century the Roman followers of Theodotus the Shoemaker were study-
ing the logic of Aristotle and Theophrastus in order to put Christian beliefs 
in the form of demonstrations. These Christians held Galen in very high 
esteem.50 There are good reasons to suspect that the interest in Galen was 
not limited to this peculiar group. Recently Matyáš Havrda has argued that 
the underlying source   
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for the notes on demonstration in the so-called eighth book of the Stromata 
can be identified as Galen’s lost work De demonstratione.51 If this is true, 
Galen is the missing link between Aristotle and Clement. For almost all the 
arguments about demonstration that are integretated in the seven books of 
the Stromata, can be found in this appended collection of notes: that 
demonstration is always depending on what is better known, that every 
demonstration therefore leads to first principles that are believable of itself 
(τὰ ἐξ αὑτῶν πιστά), that these principles ask for indemonstrable faith, and 
that sense perception and intelligence are alternative starting points for 
demonstration.52 The connection of this type of epistemology with the phi-
losophy of Galen has also been substantiated by Alberto D’Anna in his 
study of De resurrectione.53 
Aristotle, Theophrastus, and the Peripatetics distinguished between two 
classes of things, namely what is perceptible and what is intelligible. The 
criterion of truth is what is evident to respectively sense perception or the 
intellect.54 Galen, who thought ‘that the best accounts of scientific demon-
stration were written by the old philosophers, Theophrastus and Aristotle’,55 
followed them in this respect: 
The philosophers of old, in turn, say there is a twofold class of things that are appar-
ent (phenomena): one component [...] comprises those things discerned by a sense, 
————— 
48  See Gisela Striker, Κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας (Göttingen, 1974). 
49  Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 125–131. 
50  Reported by an anonymous source of Eusebius, H.E. 5.28. 
51  Matyáš Havrda, ‘Galenus Christianus? The Doctrine of Demonstration in Stromata VIII 
and the Question of its Source’, Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011), 343–375. 
52  See especially Clem. Alex. Str. 8.(3.)7.1–3; 8.(4.)9.1. 
53  D’Anna, Pseudo-Giustino, Sulla resurrezione, 191–202. 
54  Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathemathicos 7.217–218. See also R.J. Hankinson, ‘A 
Purely Verbal Dispute? Galen on Stoic and Academic Epistomology’, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 45 (1991), 267–300, at 271. 
55  Gal. P.H.P. 2.2.4. All translations of P.H.P. are from De Lacy. 
such as whiteness or blackness, hardness or softness, hot or cold, and suchlike, while 
the other comprises those things which fall under the intellect at their first apprehen-
sion and are indemonstrable [...].56 
This summary is followed by a reference to De demonstratione. Galen does 
not become tired of repeating ‘that the demonstration of every opinion goes 
back to logical beginnings.’57 A premiss must be evident to the senses and 
to the mind, ‘so as to be primary and credible in itself (ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πιστόν).’58 
In De optimo docendi genere Galen opts, over against skepticism, for judg-
ing the truth of arguments in order to make clear what their nature is and to 
investigate whether they are true or false. That is possible with the natural 
criterion of sense perception, but, because it is impossible to judge the very 
criterion with which everything else is judged, you have no other choice 
than  
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to believe or not to believe the criterion.59 These statements are very close 
parallels of the epistemological remarks of the prologue of De resurrec-
tione.  
The affinity between both approaches gains even more profile by taking 
into account Galen’s distinctive philosophical position. Although he values 
both reason and experience, he has more confidence in the latter: findings 
of the rational method should, wherever possible, be checked against per-
ception and experience. According to him, the disagreements among phi-
losophers about cosmological and theological matters are the result of the 
fact that there is no judgment possible with an empirical test, with clear 
sense perception. Therefore, this speculative philosophy is useless and has 
no practical value.60 In the prologue of De resurrectione, however, the natu-
ral criterion of sense perception is not accompanied by the limited human 
λόγος, but by the λόγος of the Truth, which provides certainty from above 
that exceeds the natural method of knowledge. Alberto D’Anna states: the 
Word of Truth intervenes where knowledge in the Galenic sense ends.61 
The epistemology of Clement of Alexandria and the author of De resur-
rectione seems, compared with the philosophy of the time, to have much in 
————— 
56  Gal. M.M. 1.4. Translation of Johnston and Horsley. 
57  So, for example, Gal. P.H.P. 9.8.1. 
58  Gal. P.H.P. 2.5.5. See also Hipp. elem. 2.33. 
59  Galen, De optimo docendi genere 2.1–5; 3.1–2; 4.2. Galeno, Sull’ottima maniera 
d’insegnare […], ed. Adelmo Barigazzi, CMG V 1.1 (Berlin, 1991). 
60  See for example Gal. M.M. 1.4; 2.7; 4.3; and especially Gal. P.H.P. 9.6.21–22; 9.7.9–18. 
Michael Frede, ‘On Galen’s Epistemology’, in: Vivian Nutton (ed.), Galen: Problems and Pro-
spects ([London], 1981), 65–86, at 81–85. See also D’Anna, Pseudo-Giustino, Sulla resurrezione, 
194. 
61  ‘[...] la parola della Verità interviene laddove si arresta la scienza, nel senso galenico del 
termine.’ D’Anna, Pseudo-Giustino, Sulla resurrezione, 202. 
common with Galen’s theory of knowledge, who on his turn followed 
mainly Aristotle, Theophrastus and the Peripatetics. The distinctive contri-
bution of Clement and the author of De resurrectione is to have interpreted 
πίστις in God in the light of the philosophical trust in first principles, which 
are beyond demonstration. By integrating the revelation of the truth in a 
philosophical system they attempted to solve the problem of the intellectual 
contempt for blind faith. Raoul Mortley writes: ‘Clément, pour la première 
fois réussit à réaliser une synthèse entre la pistis de la philosophie et la 
pistis de la religion chrétienne.’62 The same could be said about the author 
of De resurrectione, because the exact relation between Clement and Pseu-
do-Justin is still an open question. 
Conclusion 
Pseudo-Justin’s De resurrectione is aimed at the ‘weak’, who doubt the 
resurrection of the flesh and run the risk of falling prey to the devil. On two 
major points the author uses Hellenistic philosophy to strengthen his case. 
The prologue, which has the function of a theological prolegomenon, sets 
out  
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the author’s view on the relation of truth, proof and belief. Shaped in the 
philosophical language of the time, it provides a synthesis of the Christian 
understanding of faith and Hellenistic epistemology. The closest parallel, 
apart from Clement of Alexandria’s epistemology, is Galen’s theory of 
knowledge, in which trust/belief in the indemonstrable first principles plays 
a fundamental role, and in which the criterion of sense perception has prec-
edence over the sometimes fallible and speculative reason. Pseudo-Justin 
complements Galen’s epistemology with a revealed criterion, the Word of 
Truth. The view expressed in the prologue has the intention of silencing 
accusations of anti-intellectualism. The message to those who are hesitating 
to accept a doctrine that supposedly demands blind faith, is that faith is not 
a simplistic alternative for proof, but carries the proof in itself. 
Viewed from the perspective of the dominant intellectual culture, the 
idea of the resurrection of the flesh is deviant. It is, therefore, a bold move 
that the author of De resurrectione does not hesitate to claim the support of 
Greek natural philosophy. His strategy, in this case explicitly explained and 
justified, is to defeat the opponents on what they think is their own terrain. 
For nothing is outside of God, not even the arguments of ‘those outside’. 
The opponents appear to be in line with the dominant intellectual culture, 
————— 
62  Mortley, Connaissance religieuse, 122. 
but in front of the intended audience of doubters they are shown to be ulti-
mate outsiders, not even capable of understanding worldly arguments. In 
other words, by his attempt to prove the possibility of the resurrection of the 
flesh on the basis of natural philosophy the author reduces the deviance of 
his own view and hopes to take away the attractiveness of the opposing 
position. The author of De resurrectione, therefore, uses Hellenistic philos-
ophy as an (in this case) unexpected, but powerful ally to turn the tables on 
his opponents in order to get the upper hand. By connecting with the status 
and respectability of philosophy he tries to gain power over the boundary 
and to bring the ‘weak’ into the safety zone of the Word of Truth. 
